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This thesis presents a Lanchester-based mathematical model of
a small unit infantry attack on a defended position. It proposes that a
major factor in actual combat is the suppression of fire of one side by
a heavy volume of accurate fire from its opponents and incorporates
this phenomenon into the model.
Following the development of the model, different offensive
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I. INTRODUCTION
The mission of the infantry in offensive combat is to close with
and destroy the enemy. On the other hand, an infantry unit in a defensive
posture has the opposite mission of repelling the offensive unit's assault.
The best way for each side to accomplish its specific mission, the
question of tactics and fire distribution, has been endlessly studied and
debated throughout history.
Nevertheless, in spite of the great interest in the field, a need
still exists for a mathematical model which will indicate the relative
effectiveness of various tactics employed by small infantry units attack-
ing a defended position.
This is not to imply that models of such engagements have not
been constructed. Many, both deterministic and stochastic, have been
developed. However, most of them fail to take into account fire sup-
pression, a factor of the utmost importance in actual combat. In fact,
the noted military expert Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall has
written that the almost invariable cause of defeat in small unit actions
is not excessive casualties but shrinkage of fire [19].
Suppression, or shrinkage, of the enemy's fire is accomplished
by subjecting him to fire of such volume and accuracy that he will
seek cover rather than continue to fire his weapon. Thus, as one
side's fire is reduced, the other side can increase its own. If a
simple constant rate of fire is assumed for both sides in an engagement,
this interaction of fire intensity and accuracy is not taken into account.
The purpose of this thesis was to develop a deterministic mathe-
matical model of combat which would take into account the phenomenon
of fire suppression. This model, based on Lanchester's theories of
combat, was then used to investigate the offensive tactics and defen-
sive fire distribution of a small scale infantry action.
Specifically, the type of action studied was an attack against a
defended position. The missions of the attacking and defending units
were respectively to gain or maintain control of the defended position
while holding their own casualties to a minimum. The offensive force
had two tactics which it could employ - advance its entire force against
the enemy or advance only a portion of its force while using the re-
mainder to lay down a covering fire. The defense then had the decision
of how to divide its fires to engage the attacking elements.
The following chapters present in greater detail the background
of the problem, the difficulties encountered, and the results of the
work. Chapter II discusses small unit infantry actions and defines
pertinent terms. Chapter III briefly discusses Lanchester's equations.
Chapter IV looks at the model itself, including the scenario, the as-
sumptions made, and the actual development of the model. Chapter V
covers model implementation. Chapter VI finally presents conclusions
and recommendations for further study.
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II. INFANTRY TACTICS
The purpose of offensive infantry tactics is simply to allow an
infantry unit to accomplish its primary mission - to close with and
destroy the enemy. This chapter will discuss infantry tactics, specifi-
cally small unit tactics, in the attack phase of offensive combat in
order to serve as a background for the mathematical modeling described
later in this thesis. The tactics described and the terminology used
are based on U . S. Marine Corps doctrine [18, 29, 3 0].
It must be remembered that actual combat and the tactics employed
therein are not as cut-and -dried as the following descriptions would
make them seem. The tactics employed by a military commander will
be affected by his mission, the disposition of both the enemy and friendly
forces, and by the terrain. However, if anything can be described as
typical in war, the following will be a description of a typical small
unit attack on an enemy defensive position.
For the purposes of this paper a small infantry unit will be defined
as a fire team, squad, or platoon. As constructed by the Marine Corps,
a fire team consists of four men. The squad is composed of three fire
teams headed by a squad leader. A platoon is formed of three squads
and a platoon headquarters. For all practical purposes, the headquarters
should not be considered a fighting element, but a controlling unit for
the squads .
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Offensive combat is divided into four phases:




This paper will concern itself with the attack phase, which can again be
divided into four phases:
1 . Advance by fire and maneuver
2. Assault position
3. Assault through the assigned objective
4 . Pursuit by fire
The attack phase begins when the attacking force crosses the
line of departure (LOD) , an imaginary coordinating line perpendicular
to the direction of advance. The assault units advance, taking ad-
vantage of any cover and concealment offered by the terrain. Whenever
possible, the assaulting force moves under the protection of a base of
fire directed upon the enemy positions by friendly supporting units
(see Figure 1) .
If subjected to effective small arms fire before reaching the assault
position, the assault force advances by fire and maneuver. That is,
part of the assault force advances while the remainder fires at the









ATTACK ON A DEFENDED POSITION
Figure 1
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The assault position is located as close to the enemy as the
assaulting elements can move by fire and maneuver without taking ex-
cessive casualties and without masking the fire of supporting units.
Normally, it is less than 150 meters from the enemy positions. At this
point final coordination is made by the assaulting elements as they pre-
pare for the final assault.
Upon order of the assaulting force commander, the assault
through the final objective commences. The assault unit moves on line
through the enemy positions with individuals delivering a heavy volume
of well directed fire from the hip or shoulder. The assault fire, charac-
terized by volume, violence, and accuracy, is designed to either kill
the enemy or to keep him pinned down until he can be overrun. As the
assault unit moves through the objective, the supporting fires either
cease or shift to other targets.
After moving through the objective as rapidly as possible while
still maintaining a heavy volume of well-directed fire, the assaulting
unit takes up hasty firing positions to pursue the fleeing enemy by fire
and to repulse any enemy counterattacks.
Throughout the attack, fire superiority must be maintained over
the enemy. That is, the enemy must be subjected to fire of such
accuracy and volume that his fire ceases or becomes ineffective. With-
out this superiority the enemy is capable of directing such a large volume
of fire against the assaulting elements that forward movement is dif-




For small infantry units there are basically two forms of maneuver,
One is the frontal attack, which is an attack against the enemy's front
with pressure exerted all along the enemy line. The other is the single
envelopment, in which part of the attackers maneuver to an assault
position on the enemy's flank while the rest of the unit provides a
covering base of fire. Often elements of both types of maneuvers are
present in an attack.
Since both types of maneuver have the same phases of the attack
as discussed above, this paper will not differentiate between the two
in deriving a model of the attack.
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III. LANCHESTER EQUATIONS
Lanchester equations [31] are mathematical formulations of combat,
which calculate the rates of attrition for two opposing forces composed
of identical units (e.g., infantrymen, tanks, or airplanes) . The Lan-
chester combat model assumes that all units on both sides are within
range of all the opponents' weapons.
Lanchester' s equations can be divided into two categories - the
linear law and the square law.
Lanchester' s linear law can be thought of as the attrition rate of
one side when the other side uses area fire. This type of fire is best
described as when one side, not knowing the exact locations of the
opponents, fires into the general area of their positions.
Assume that the two opposing forces can be considered attackers
and defenders. Then the linear law for the defenders is
^ = -£<A A(t)D(t)
where ~r- is the attrition rate of the defenders at time t, cK. is the
dt A
rate at which one attacker kills defenders, and A(t) and D(t) are the
sizes of the attacking and defending forces respectively at time t.
Lanchester' s square law is equivalent to the opponents using
aimed fire, where all targets are visible and the fire is distributed
uniformly over all live targets.
16
Again let the two sides be attackers and defenders, but this time
let the attackers employ aimed fire. The attrition rate for the defenders
can be written
T •-****
where A. is the rate at which one attacker kills defenders and A(t) is
the number of attackers at time t.
Naturally, similar equations would be used to calculate the
attacking force's attrition rate. Thus, by knowing the modes of fire
(aimed or area), the opposing strengths, and the attrition rate coef-
ficients for each side, the number remaining on each side after a given
length of time can be calculated by solving two simultaneous differ-
ential equations
.
The most difficult task in formulating these types of equations is
the determination of the attrition rate coefficients. Bonder [6] points
but that prediction of battle results has been hampered by the inability
of analysts to correctly predict these numbers, which are generally
developed in the following ways.
The attrition rate coefficient for force A using area fire against
force D at time t, ^ (t) , is the product of the rate of fire of the in-
dividual elements of A at time t multiplied by the quotient of the exposed







This, of course, assumes that all elements of D are within A .
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For aimed fire the attrition rate coefficient for force A firing at
force D at time t is
p Aw-pk fc> rAw
where P, (t) is the single shot kill probability at time t and r (t) is defined
k A
as in the preceding equation.
Often the attrition rate coefficients are formulated as constants
and not as functions of time. Especially for dynamic small unit infantry
actions , this is a fallacy which weakens the accuracy of the model in
predicting final results. As will be seen, this thesis presents a solution
which considers these coefficients as time (and range) dependent.
18
IV. DISCUSSION OF THE MODEL
The model developed in this thesis, based on Lanchester's theories
of combat, determines the outcome of a small unit infantry action. Since
so many different parameters affect the outcome of such engagements,
this can in no way be considered an all inclusive model.
The relative combat power of opposing infantry units is based on
many factors - "surprise, maneuver, dispositions, cover, concealment,
fields of fire, observations, obstacles, effective firepower, and ad-
equate supplies" in addition to "initiative, human performance, leader-
ship, command, control, and communications" [28]. While maneuver,
cover, and concealment are incorporated, the model developed herein
looks primarily at opposing numerical strengths and the firepower (both
accuracy and volume) of the opponents .
However, these are the most important factors in small unit actions.
As Brigadier General Marshall has written, the most important single thing
needed in combat is more and better fire, since "almost the invariable
cause of defeat in local actions is shrinkage of fire" [19] . This shrink-
age is caused both by casualties and by suppression. These are
investigated by this model.
A. SCENARIO
The small unit infantry action modelled in this thesis is a daylight
attack against a stationary defensive position. The mission of the
19
attackers is to capture the enemy position at all costs. To accomplish
this, the attacking force commander has the option of closing the defen-
ders with his entire force by means of fire and maneuver or of advancing
a portion of his unit (the assault force) by this method and employing
the remainder as a base of fire to cover the advance.
The assault advances by fire and maneuver until it reaches the
final coordination line. It then forms on line and advances through the
enemy's position. After the final coordination line is past, the base of
fire ceases fire entirely to avoid hitting friendly troops.
The defenders' mission is to defend their position to the last man.
They are dug in in static positions, but their field fortifications consist
of nothing more elaborate than uncovered foxholes and shallow trenches .
The terrain provides the defenders and the base of fire with a
limited degree of cover and concealment. It offers no impassable
obstacles to the assaulting force and does not slow its advance. On
the other hand, the terrain offers no cover or concealment to the attacker
unless he is in the prone position.
B. ASSUMPTIONS
Because the model is based on Lanchester's theories of combat,
the assumptions associated with those theories must be made in the
development of this model. Thus, each individual on either side is
within range of all the weapons of the other side. In a small unit in-
fantry action, this seems to be a reasonable assumption.
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It must be assumed that each man fires independently of all other
individuals. Actually, in a well-trained infantry unit the leader will
control the fire of his men so that there is no lull in the firing. However,
assuming a constant rate of fire for all shooters produces the same result
since the rate of fire for the unit in either case would be a constant.
It must be further assumed that the rounds fired by each shooter
are not serially correlated. If it is assumed that every individual on
each side is armed with a semi-automatic rifle which fires only one
round with each trigger pull, this non-correlation between rounds is
not too far from what actually might happen. This is especially so
because in the heat of combat it is very difficult to observe the impact
of single rounds in order to make aiming corrections.
Lanchester's theories of combat assume that fire is uniformly
distributed over an area or group of targets. Generally, when targets
are visible, the infantry leader will insure that his unit fires at all
targets (assuming they are all of equal importance) . But, in area fire,
fire will usually be directed at the most likely enemy locations rather
than over the whole target area. Nevertheless, the model developed
in this thesis has the supposition that area fire is uniform over the
entire area
.
The model was designed to look at both the case when the two
sides employ aimed fire exclusively (i.e. , all targets are visible), and
the case when area fire is employed against all combatants except the
moving element in the assault force. Against these troops, aimed fire
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is always employed. In actual combat, some mix of area and aimed fire
would probably be used in most cases, depending, of course, upon the
situation. However, in this thesis only the two extremes were investi-
gated .
It is quite possible for an individual to continue fighting even
after being wounded. In this work, however, it is assumed that any
person hit becomes a totally non-effective combatant.
It is further assumed that only the base of fire and the non-
maneuvering elements of the assault force fire at the defenders. This
is in line with accepted doctrine which says that the maneuvering
element does not fire but simply moves a predetermined distance on
each rush as rapidly as possible. This unit then commences to fire at
the defenders and another element of the assault force makes its rush.
In the model, when the assault force reaches the final coordination
line (FCL) , it immediately launches the final assault, moving on line
toward the enemy while firing at a high rate of fire. At the same time
the fire from the base of fire ceases. Actually, some coordination
time at the FCL would probably be necessary, but ignoring this should
have no adverse effects of the results of the model.
It is also assumed that the supply of ammunition is not a factor
in the problem. Since both the defenders and the base of fire are
stationary, this is not an unreasonable assumption for them. The
assault force, on the other hand, would be limited to the number of
22
rounds they could carry. However, for the scenario described above, the
assault force should be able to carry a sufficient amount to complete its
mission
.
The model assumes that a fixed percentage of the defenders fire
at the assault elements while the remainder fire at the base of fire.
This ratio of fire is maintained until the assault elements reach the
FCL, at which time all the surviving defenders shift fire to the assault
group.
Another important assumption made is that shooters can be sup-
pressed (i.e. , made to cease fire and take cover for a period of time)
by incoming rounds which pass within a certain distance of them. While
the closeness of the rounds and the number of rounds needed for sup-
pression may be open for debate, the fact that suppression is a valid
phenomenon in combat is unquestionable.
The assumptions presented in this section are the more important
ones in the development of this thesis. In the sections to follow other
assumptions are made in order to construct the different portions of the
model. When this occurs, the assumption is clearly identified as such.
C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL
The model developed in this work forecasts the winning side in
a small unit infantry action between an attacking and a defending
force. Since the defenders' task is to hold a piece of terrain and deny
its use to the attackers, the victors in this model are the ones who
have the most men on the objective when the attacking forces reaches
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the defenders' positions. It was assumed that the two sides at this point
in time would kill each other at the same rate so that the more numerous
side should have more men remaining when the opponents are completely
destroyed.
1 . Objectives
Given the scenario described above, the objective of the
offensive, or attacking, force is to seize the terrain occupied by the
defenders with a minimum number of casualties. In order to successfully
carry out this mission, the offensive side must place more men than the
defenders on the objective at the end of the fire fight. Also, the offen-
sive force could be working under a time constraint, although this would
not always be the case.
This could be represented mathematically by
minimize (A _ - A _)
tO tf




V Mtf Dtf - °
where tO is the time at which the action starts, tf the time the action
terminates, A and A the total number of attackers at times tO and tf
respectively, AA the number of attackers on the objective at tf , D
the number of defenders at tf, and T the time in which the action must
c
be completed. AA is not necessarily the same as A since the
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offensive force need not assault with its entire force. It may be divided
so that a portion of the unit supports the assault by firing from stationary
positions
.
On the other hand, the objective of the defenders is to repulse the
attack while sustaining the least number of casualties possible. Mathe-
matically represented this is




- D ) ± O
tf tf
AA ,, A ., D , > O .
tf tf tf
In other words both sides want to keep their casualties to a
minimum while still having more men on the final objective at the con-
clusion of the battle. If either problem is infeasible, then the attack
or the defense, whichever is applicable, cannot be successfully completed
2 . General Model
In order to achieve their objectives both sides must mini-
mize their casualties. Since the model developed in this thesis is
based on Lanchester's theories of combat, the most basic determination
of casualties for the attackers would be
dA= - << DA(t ) D(tQ ) dt
where o< n is the rate at which one defender using area type fire kills
attackers, A(t ) is the number of attackers at the start of the action,
D(t ) is the number of defenders at the start of the action, and dt is
the duration of the battle.
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If the defenders used aimed fire, the number of casualties for
the attackers would be
dA=
-£ D D(tQ ) dt
where ^ is the rate at which one defender using aimed fire kills
attackers. The rest of the symbols are as defined above.




A(t ) D(t ) dt
dD = - @ A A(t ) dt
for the attackers employing area and aimed fire respectively.
In the above equations, the attrition rate coefficients were
presumed to be constants. Recall from the discussion of Lanchester
equations that for area fire
oC.(t) = r.(t) P (t) i = A, D
1 1 Ki
with r (t) the rate of fire of each man on side i at time t and P T , (t) the
i Ki
single shot kill probability for side i at time t. P„.(t) was taken to be
Ki
equal to the exposed area of an individual on side j, j = A or D, divided
A




For aimed fire the attrition rate coefficient is
£ .(t) = r.(t) P (t) i = A, DV 1 l Ki
where the symbols are as described above.
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If r.(t) and P^.(t) were constants throughout the engagement,
1 JS.1
determining the casualties for each side would simply involve putting
these values in the proper equations and performing the necessary mathe-
matics. However, these assumptions are not true, and modifications
must be made to the model to take this into account.
3. Single Shot Hit Probability
As was mentioned before, this model assumes that a hit
produces an incapacitating casualty, and thus may be regarded as a
kill as far as determining the outcome of the conflict.
When area fire is employed, the single shot hit probability
for a round fired by side i against side j is
Hi A
J
where A is the exposed target area of an individual on side j and A.
ej 3
is the total area fired into by side i. Recall that this assumes that all
members of side j are within A (see Figure 2) .
J
For the purposes of this model, P for the area fire case
Hi
is assumed to be constant. There is the possibility that as the fire
fight progresses, side i could better judge A. and shift fires accordingly.
This, however, will not be investigated, except for one instance which
will be described in the following chapter.
The single shot hit probability for aimed fire, again labelled
P TT .(t) , cannot be considered a constant.Hi
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It was assumed that the individuals on each side present cir-
cular targets to their opponents. Further, it was assumed that fire
distribution was described by a circular normal distribution in the plane
of the target with the vertical and horizontal standard deviation of the
rounds ( cr and cr respectively) being equal. Also, the center of the
x y
target was assumed to be the center of impact of the fire distribution.
Recall that each round fired was considered independent of all other
rounds.
Thus, PTT .(t) can be writtenHi
1V'Wo h IfFft) 2 exp x xdxd(9(Tit)
where r is the radius of the target and CT(t) is the standard deviation
2 2
of the circular normal distribution ( cr (t) = \J G~ (t) + CT (t) ). After
x y
-6




.(t) = | - exp
J- (T-(t)
Since the area of the target, A
.








Finally, it is assumed that the distribution of the angular aim error
is independent of range [2 6]. Thus, when the standard deviation, CT(t),
is expressed in mils, P TT .(t) becomesHi
(2) P (t) =
J
- exp
where R(t) is the range to the target at time t and a is the aiming error
A .10









Aj = Total Area
A
ej = Exposed Area of an Individual
A
sj = Area of Suppression of an Individual
Areas for Hits and Suppression
Figure 2
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in mils. Range was considered time dependent because in the scenario
described the range between the attackers and the defenders decreases
with time.
This final result was arrived at by applying the standard con-
3
version formula for mils , m = W x 10 , where W is the width to be
R
converted to mils expressed in some unit of length, and R is the range
to the target expressed in the same unit of measure. Thus, it can be
seen from equation (2) that unless the battle is fought at one constant
range, the single shot hit probability will change with range. As the
range decreases , P_j.(t) increases.
H i
4 . Suppression
Both equations formulated to calculate single shot hit
probabilities, (1) and (2) above, were designed with the understanding
that a target is present. However, it will often be the case that an
individual in combat, while not hit by an incoming round, will have had
a round pass so close to him that it will cause him to seek cover rather
than continue to fire his weapon. That is, the individual will be sup-
pressed.
In formulating the model, it was assumed that any participant
in a fire fight has an area of suppression, A (see Figure 2) . If a round
enters this area, the individual will seek cover, thus not firing his
weapon for a certain length of time, but also not presenting himself as
a target during that time period.
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As in the study of the hit probability, two cases were looked
at - area and aimed fire.
In the case where side i uses area fire against side j, the













being the area of suppression for an individual on side j and
A. being the total area for side j.
J
In the case when side i employs aimed fire, the same as-
sumptions were made to derive the single shot probability of suppression,
P (t) as were used to derive P TT .(t) the single shot hit probability,
si Hi








(t) = J-exp I- si
7?R(t) 2 a 2
^
where R(t) is the range to the target and a is the aiming error in mils .
5 . Expected Time Suppressed
Having determined the single shot probability of a round
entering an individual's area of suppression, the next task was to
determine the expected time that a combatant would be suppressed.
Let /\ be the rate at which rounds enter an area of sup-
pression. For area fire by side i against side j







where r (t) is the rate of fire of an individual on side i at time t, I(t) is
i




where J(t) is the number of men on side j at time t and all other terms
are as defined above. By examining this equation it can be seen that
by dividing by J(t) it was assumed that incoming fire is evenly divided
among the individuals on side j.
Let t be the time that an individual is suppressed by one
round entering his area of suppression. Let t , be the additional time
si
that the individual stays suppressed, given that he is already suppressed,
when another round enters A .
s
Since the rounds are independent, it can be assumed that
they arrive as a Poisson distribution with rate p{ . This assumption makes






Then the expected time that an individual would be sup-
pressed in a time period /\ t could be written
E(t. s .) = a a tu - pa.t. < ts0 ))ts0 + 2 a t pa.t. < ts0)tsl
Combining terms this becomes
E(t.s.) = A M [t ^P(i.t. > t ) + t .P(i.t.£ t )
'' L sD sO si sO
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6. Kill Probability
Having determined the expected time suppressed, E(t.s.),
in an interval of time At, it was then possible to calculate the kill
probability. Recall that the single shot hit probability, P (t) , was
Hi
predicated on the assumption that the target was always present. Actually,
the probability that a target is present in some time interval A t can be
described by
P(t.p.) = 1 - E(t.s.)
At
That is, it is the expected time the target is not suppressed in /\ t
divided by A t.
Therefore, the single shot kill probability P„.(t) can be
K.i
written
P„.(t) = P__.(t) P(t.p.)
Ki Hi
7 . Rates of Fire
Suppression also affects the rates of fire for both sides,
since if an individual is suppressed, he cannot be firing his weapon.
Let r
.
be the rate of fire which an individual on side i is
oi
capable of maintaining if he is not suppressed. Then to determine the
rate of fire, r , of that individual given that he is being shot at in some
i
time interval At the equation
r (t) = r [At- E(t.s.)]
A t




[ 1 -P(t.s.) ]
1 01
where P(t.s.) is the probability of suppression in ^t.
8 . Allotting Fires
The next alteration to be made to the simplified model is to
incorporate the fact that the offensive force assaults with only a portion
of its total strength while employing the remainder as a base of fire to
cover the assaulting elements. Therefore, the defending force must
divide its fire in some proportion to cover the two portions of the of-
fensive force
.
Let (fbe the fraction of the attackers employed in the base
of fire. Let ^ be the percentage of the defending force assigned to fire








=-c< D (pD(t) AB (t)
dt
if area fire is employed. A (t) is the number in the base of fire at
B
time t. Initially, A (t ) =
(ft
A(t,J , where A(tn ) is the original number
in the attacking force.
Since the assault portion of the attacking force can use the
technique of fire and maneuver (i.e. , a part moves while the rest fire
at the defenders) , the defense must again make a decision about dividing
fires. Let ^be the fraction of the defenders firing at the assault force
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which specifically fires at the non-maneuvering elements of that force.
Let M.E. be the number of maneuver elements in the assault force.
(Recall that only one maneuver element moves at any one time.) Then




-a D(i-p)^D (t )
and for the moving element is
dA (t)
—
^f- = -@ D (l -Q) (l-n) D(t),
assuming aimed fire from the defenders.






— ^c^u-e^Daxi-— )AA (t)
where A (t) is the number in the assault group at time t, and A (t ) =
(1 - ) A(t ) . Since the moving element is always visible, it was
assumed that the defenders always employ aimed fire against those
individuals .
The attrition rate for the defenders at time t would also be
different. It is
dDa.
-[,^ABkB {t)+ ^AF il -W^) AA^ldt
for the attackers using aimed fire, and




9. Fire and Maneuver
Another modification to the model is made when the concept
of fire and maneuver is employed by the assault force. Since it was
assumed that the moving elements were never suppressed, there was
no need to modify the hit probability to take into account the fact that
a target may be suppressed. However, this does not mean that the hit
probability and the kill probability for the moving element are synonymous
This is because when the attackers start their rush, it takes the defen-
ders a time to acquire these new targets.
Let the assault group be divided into M. E. equal elements.
The rush time per element, R. T. , is the sum of the starting time, S. T.
,
(i.e. , the time needed to rise from the prone position and start running)
plus the quotient of the distance rushed, y, divided by the rush velocity,
v. That is
R.T. = S.T. + y/v
Let X be the distance to be covered by fire and maneuver before the
final assault begins. Then the number of rushes for each maneuver
element to cover X is
rX
The total time for the entire assault group to move a
distance X is then
T.T. =
rX n M.E. (R.T. + C.T.)
LY J
Where C.T. is the time needed by the assault group leader to coordinate
the various elements between rushes. Therefore, the total time that the
maneuvering fraction of the assault group would be moving and exposing
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a larger target area would be
E.T. = — M.E. (R.T.)
Since the defenders must acquire these targets every time a
rush is started, the time, F.T. , that the defenders would be firing at
the maneuvering element over the entire distance covered by fire and
maneuver can be calculated by the equation
F.T. = — M.E. (R.T. - A.T.)
where A.T. is the acquisition time at the beginning of each new rush.
The average probability that the defenders will be firing at
a maneuvering element, P(ME) , is simply the firing time of the defend-
ers against the maneuvering elements divided by the total time needed
by the assault force to cover the distance from the line of departure to
the final coordination line,
P(ME) - ~~ .
T.T.
This probability would have to be multiplied by the probability of
hitting these moving targets in order to calculate the probability of a
kill against the maneuvering portion of the assault force.
D. FINAL MODEL
To summarize, the casualty rates for the defending force with the
entire offensive force using area fire is
^ if = - [AB (t) <*B W + (1 " IZi-.'V * A^J D(t)
and with the entire offensive force employing aimed fire is
(4, T--fVt»§Bw + °-MT>A !vw ^Aw]'
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where A (t) , A (t) , and D(t) are the sizes of the base of fire, the assault
B A
group, and the defending force, respectively, at time t, oC(t) is the
attrition rate coefficient for area fire and Q (t) the coefficient for aimed
fire at time t, and M.E. is the number of maneuver elements in the
assault group.




- eD (t) e
D(t)




if area fire is used. In the above equations O is the fraction of the
defenders firing at the base of fire, with all other terms being the same
as in equations (3) and (4) .
For the assault group the casualty rate for the non-maneuvering
elements when area fire is used against them is
(7) dA (f)
^f-=-^ D <i-e>7ZD<t)(i-—)AA <t )
and when aimed fire is employed by the defense is
(8) dA (t)
^ = -eD (t)(l- e )^(t)
where W is the fraction of the defending force firing at the assault group
which concentrates its fire on the non-maneuvering elements.
Since it was assumed that only aimed fire is used against the
maneuvering element, the casualty rate for that unit is
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(9) dAAMW
-i^ = -^DM (t)(i
-e
)(l -^ )D(t)
with (p (t) being the attrition rate coefficient for the defenders
employing aimed fire against the maneuver element.
Equations (3) through (9) hold until the final coordination line is
reached. At this time the base of fire ceases fire and the assault group
attacks in an on-line formation. The casualty rates then become
(10) dDjt>
= _ () ()
dt VAAWV ' '
& (t) being the attrition rate coefficient for the assault group in the
final assault, and
(11) dA (t)
-f- = -«SD (t)D(t)
assuming both sides use aimed fire. If the attackers use area fire
equation (10) becomes
The attrition rate coefficients, which vary over time, are simply
the single shot kill probability multiplied by the rate of fire.
oC. = P„.r.(t)
l Ki i
3 . =P„.(t)r.(t)xi Ki l
where ^ . and ft , are the attrition rate coefficients for side i using
area and aimed fire, respectively, against side j.
P, (t) , the single shot kill probability, equals the single shot
Ki
probability of a hit, given that a target is present, multiplied by the
probability that a target is present.
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being the rate of fire for an individual on side and P(t.s.) being
the probability that a shooter on side i is suppressed.
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V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MODEL
As was mentioned previously, the purpose of this thesis was to
investigate within a limited scenario whether it is more advantageous
for an attacking unit to employ part of its strength as a base of fire or
to advance its entire force by fire and maneuver. To do this, a computer
program was designed to calculate the outputs of the model, thus deter-
mining the results of engagements fought under different conditions.
This chapter discusses the program itself and investigates the results
of battles fought with different tactics employed by the offensive force.
A. THE COMPUTER PROGRAM
The program designed to calculate the outputs of the model uses
FORTRAN IV language and was run on an IBM 360 computer. At the end
of every time increment, dt, it calculates the casualties and rates of
fire for both sides along with the range and time length of engagement.
It then uses these as new inputs for the next time iteration. The pro-
gram runs until either the assaulting force or the defending force is
completely annihilated or until the assault force is within 10 meters
of the defenders' positions. If the latter case occurs, the side with
the most men remaining, not counting the base of fire, is declared the
winner. The casualties are assumed to be on a 1 to 1 ratio from this
point on, so the larger force (assault or defense) is decreased by the




The parameters used in the model were of two types - variant and
invariant. The invariant parameters, to be described below, were held
constant over the entire course of the problem, no matter what values
the variable parameters were assigned. The variable parameters were
those which were manipulated to investigate the results of different
offensive tactics and different distributions of fire by the defense.
1 . Parameters Held Constant
The values for the invariant parameters used in this model
were derived from military manuals and research documents and from the
professional judgment of knowledgeable infantry officers.
a. Target Areas, Total Areas, and Areas of Suppression
The actual target areas presented by the individuals
in the action were taken from the Army's Infantry Rifle Unit Study [26]
.
This report stated that the area of a man firing from the prone position
2
was 0.1 square meters, from the kneeling position was 0.2 m , and
2
from the standing position was 0.3 m .
The target areas for the defenders and the individuals
in the base of fire were assumed to be those presented by prone shooters,
2 20.1m
.
The members of the assault force presented an area of . 3 m
during rushes and during the final assault.
It was assumed that since the non-maneuvering members
of the assault force have less time to select and prepare their positions,
if they were exposing themselves in order to fire at the defenders, they
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2
presented a larger target than the prone firers -0.15m . On the other
hand, if they did not fire, they could take cover more effectively than
2
a prone shooter and thus presented less of a target - 0.05 m .
The total area occupied by the defense, i.e. , the area
2
into which the attacking force is firing, was assumed to be 50 m when
the initial defensive strength is 4 men. This area would, of course,
vary with the terrain, but the size decided upon seemed reasonable.
When the defenders start with 12 men, the size of the area was tripled
2
to 150 m .
Since, in this study, the same number of men were
initially in the base of fire, if one was used, as were in the defense,
the total area for the base of fire was the same as that for the defenders.
The total area for the non-maneuvering elements of
2
the assault group was assumed to be 100 m when the total number of
2
attackers was initially 12 and 3 00 m when the initial number was 36.
Again these areas are arbitrary. However, it was felt that to make them
any larger would spread the assault force so much that it would be un-
manageable .
These areas held until the final assault. At this
point, it was assumed that the assault group, being within 50 meters
of the defenders, would be better able to judge the defenders' total
2
area. Therefore, this area was reduced to 30 and 90 m respectively
for initial defensive strengths of 4 and 12 .
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2
The area of suppression was assumed to be 3 . 14 m .
This was arrived at by the supposition that any round passing within 1
meter of an individual will cause him to be suppressed. Since the area
of suppression, as well as the target area is assumed to present a cir-
cular target, such an area with a radius of 1 meter has an area of approx-
2
imately 3.14m .
b. Time of Suppression
The Army's Small Arms Weapons Systems report [2 7]
estimated the time an individual is suppressed to be approximately
2 seconds. Since their assumptions concerning suppression were some-
what different than those made in this model, the time has been modified
herein to 1 . 5 seconds for initial suppression. The additional suppression
time caused by another round passing while an individual is still sup-
pressed was given the value of 0.75 seconds. It was felt that going
any more deeply into the additional suppression time would add little
to the model.
c. Acquisition, Starting, Coordination, and Target
Exposure Times
Christy experimentally obtained times to complete
rushes of 5 , 10, 20, 30 and 40 meters [8]. By examining these values
it was found that after the initial 5 meters, the speed of movement for
all other distances was approximately 7 meters per second. The first
5 meters could be covered in approximately 1.5 seconds.
Ii
It was assumed that prior to running the individual
requires a certain time to rise from the prone to the erect position. This
starting time, STIME, was given the value of 1 second.
To calculate the target exposure time of an individual
rushing 5 meters or more, the starting time and the time to complete the
rush were summed,






The rushers were not fired upon during their entire
exposure time, since it would take a defender a certain amount of time
to aim his weapon at these newly presented targets. This acquisition
time, AT IME , was given the value of 2 seconds.
Between rushes, the assault force leader would need
time to coordinate his elements. This coordination time, CTIME, was
assumed to be 5 seconds. It is quite possible that this time is overly
optimistic in that it assumed very tight control by the leader,
d. Rush Distance
The rush distance selected for use in this model was
a constant 20 meters from the time the assault force crossed the line
of departure until it reached the final coordination fine. This distance
was selected because Christy's work indicated that longer rush distances
were more effective if these distances remained constant throughout the
battle [8],
In actual practice, longer rush distances would
probably 'be employed at longer ranges and would decrease as the distance
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to the enemy decreased, and hence his kill probability increased. This,
however, is beyond the scope of this study.
e. Rates of Fire
In combat, an individual rifleman armed with a semi-
automatic weapon is expected to deliver 10 well-aimed rounds per
minute [30] . Since it was assumed that all troops in the scenario were
so armed, the rate of fire for every participant was assumed to be 10
rounds per minute if he were not suppressed.
The only exception to this is during the final assault.
Here the rate of fire should increase as a high volume of fire is critical
at this point. To take this into account, all rates of fire were doubled
to 20 rounds per minute for this portion of the action.
f . Aiming Error
The aiming error was the most difficult of the nonvariant
inputs to judge. The BRL report on the accuracy of rifle fire gives a
miss distance of 3 mils for a semi-automatic M-14 rifle fired from a
prone position at a target 300 meters distant [5]. Sterne and Yudowitch
have stated that aiming error is a function of target exposure time [22].
Using the latters' data, Christy estimated that an average aiming error
would be 10 mils for defenders firing at moving attackers and 12 mils
for attackers using fire and maneuver shooting at defenders [8]
.
This author has estimated the aiming error for stationary
individuals firing at stationary targets (i.e. , defenders firing at the base
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of fire, and vice versa) to be 5 mils. This increases the aiming error
determined by the BRL report to reflect the more difficult conditions of
the scenario.
Christy's estimates of the aiming errors for the stationary
defenders firing at the assault force, 10 mils, and the assault force
firing at the defenders, 12 mils, have been accepted as reasonably
accurate.
The aiming error for the assault force during the final
assault has been estimated to be 20 mils. This is so because the in-
dividuals are then firing while in an upright position and moving, a
difficult way to fire a rifle accurately,
g. Time Increment
The increment of time, dt, used to recalculate rates
of fire, casualties, and remaining force levels was chosen to be 5
seconds. Any time less than this used too much computer time and,
for trial runs, did not affect the outcome of the problem or significantly
change the number of total casualties.
h. Final Coordination Line
The final coordination line (FCL) was chosen to be
at a distance of 50 meters from the defensive positions. While this
would vary with the combat situation, 50 meters seemed to be a reasonable
distance to use.
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2 . Parameters Systematically Varied
The parameters which were varied in the model to test their
significance were opposing strengths, types of attack, types of fire,
the initial range of engagement, and the distribution of fire.
a. Opposing Strengths
The attacking force was always given a 3 to 1 advantage
in initial force size since this ratio of attackers to defenders is generally
accepted as the differential needed for an attacking force to secure a
defended objective.
The model was run with 12 attackers against 4 defenders
and 36 attackers against 12 defenders. In relating this to actual practice,
these strengths would be equivalent to a squad attacking a fire team and
a platoon attacking a squad.
b. Type of Attack
Four types of attacks were used in the model - a
frontal assault on line with no fire and maneuver and no base of fire,
the same type of attack with a base of fire, a frontal assault using fire
and maneuver with a base of fire, and a frontal assault employing fire
and maneuver without a base of fire. Except for flanking attacks, these
are basically the only types of attacks possible by a small infantry unit.
In dividing the attacking force into maneuver elements
and a base of fire, a triangular organization was assumed. That is, when
a base of fire was used, it would be one-third of the total force. With
or without a base of fire, each maneuvering element in the assault force
would also be one-third of the total attacking force.
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To investigate the effectiveness of the fire of the
assault force, the problem was run with and without the non-maneuvering
elements of the assault force shooting at the defenders during the fire
and maneuver phase of the attack. During the final assault, the assault
force always fired.
c. Distribution of Fire
The fraction of defenders firing at the base of fire,
RHO, was given the values of . 0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1 . whenever
the base of fire was employed. This looked at enough of the defenders'
options as far as firing at the base of fire was concerned to indicate
how their fire should be best distributed.
When the attackers used fire and maneuver, the
fraction of defenders not firing at the base of fire, (1 - RHO) , who
specifically fired at the non-maneuvering elements of the assault force,
ETA, was varied. The values assigned were again 0.0, 0.25, 0.50,
0.75, and 1.0, for the same reasons as given above for RHO.
d . Types of Fire
Two types of fire were investigated - aimed and area.
Whichever type was used for each data run was used by both sides.
The one exception to this is that the maneuvering element, since visible,
always received aimed fire.
It is possible that one side could be firing aimed and
the other side area fire./ While the model will handle this problem, it
was not addressed in this work.
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e. Initial Range of Engagement
Two initial ranges of engagement - 2 00 and 300 meters -
were selected for use in this thesis because they are distances at which
small unit actions are likely to start. It was assumed for both ranges
that the distance of the base of fire (BOF) from the defenders was the
same as the line of departure (LOD) for the assault force. This assump-
tion does not have to be made since the model can incorporate different
ranges for the BOF and the LOD. However, since it is reasonable to
assume in actual practice that the ranges would be identical, this is
the supposition made herein.
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VI. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Tables 1 through 4 give the results of attacks conducted by fire
and maneuver with and without a base of fire. The tables also record
whether aimed or area fire was used and give the fire distribution of
the defensive force. Recall that RHO is the percentage of the defenders
firing at the base of fire and ETA is the fraction of the (1 - RHO) de-
fenders not firing at the base of fire who are specifically firing at the
non-maneuvering elements of the assault force.
The tables give the results of only those engagements where
elements of the assault group fire at the enemy during the fire and man-
euver (F&M) phase of the assault. However, in this section is a
discussion of what occurred when the assault group did not fire during
F&M.
It was mentioned previously that the program was run for both 12
attackers versus 4 defenders and 3 6 attackers versus 12 defenders. It
was found that since all the total areas were tripled when force sizes
were tripled, the results obtained were exactly three times the results
of the 12 vs 4 test runs for both area and aimed type fire. Therefore,
it was decided to record only the 12 versus 4 results herein.
When the attacking force employed a frontal attack with no fire
and maneuver and no base of fire, from either 200 or 3 00 meters, it
invariably lost. Some attackers reached the final coordination line,
but none were able to advance closer than 3 5 meters from the defenders
before being completely wiped out.
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When the offense employed a base of fire (BOF) but advanced with-
out F&M, it again always met with defeat. In both the aimed and area
fire case from 200 and 300 meters the defenders always minimized their
casualties by concentrating all their fire on the assault force and ignoring
the base of fire.
The BOF was most effective when aimed fire was employed from 2 00
meters. However, even in this case the defenders were better off to
concentrate on the assault group since it had a shorter distance to cover,
150 rather than 250 meters, before it began the final assault.
Both of the above cases were conducted with tactics which would
rarely be employed in modern warfare since the accuracy and firing rate
of small arms today would make attacks with the assault force constantly
exposed very costly. The real question to be answered was whether a
unit using fire and maneuver should attack a defended position with or
without a base of fire. Recall that when a BOF is employed, only two
maneuver elements are available, versus three when the BOF is not used.
In examining Tables 1 and 3, which contain the data for aimed
fire, it can be seen that the attacking force will always win when it
enjoys a 3 to 1 initial size advantage.
The defenders were always able to inflict more casualties by
concentrating the fire of the riflemen shooting at the assault group on
the non-maneuvering elements. There are two reasons for this. The
first is that as the assault group closes the range, its fire becomes
more effective, since the single shot kill probability is a function of
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range. The second reason is that while the defenders firing at the man-
euvering element fire only a portion of the total time, the other defenders
are firing continuously. Thus, more rounds can be fired at the non-
maneuvering elements, which increases the likelihood of a kill.
It can also be noted that the defenders" fire is deadlier against
an offensive force with a BOF if at 3 00 meters the base of fire is ignored
and at 200 meters it is engaged heavily. This is simply because as the
range decreases, the fire of the BOF becomes more accurate, thus making
it more of a factor in the battle.
Assuming that the defenders fire in the most effective manner, the
offense was better off if it employed a base of fire from both 2 00 and
3 00 meters. This result held also in the case where the assault group
did not fire until it reached the final coordination line. In fact, in that
case the attack could not succeed without a base of fire.
In contrast to this, Tables 2 and 4 show that when area fire was
employed by both sides, the offensive force was better off by assaulting
with its entire force. The principal reason for this is that since the fire
is less accurate than in the aimed case, the attacking force would find
it more beneficial to have a greater volume of fire during the final assault
rather than a relatively low volume of unaimed fire delivered by the BOF
before the final assault.
It can be seen in the area fire case that the defensive force is most
effective in minimizing its casualties when it concentrates fire on the
maneuver element. This is because it was assumed that aimed fire is
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always employed against that visible element. Thus, the single shot
probability of a hit against it is much higher than against an area type
target.
From the above results it can be concluded that when aimed fire
is used by both sides, an attacking force with a three to one manpower
and firepower advantage should use a base of fire when within 200 and
300 meters of the defensive positions in order to reduce casualties.
On the other hand, when area fire is employed, the entire offensive
force should close with the enemy to insure victory.
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Table 1
Aimed Fire - 300 Meters
TACTIC RHO ETA VICTOR OFF. CAS. DEF. CAS
F&M 0.0 0.0 A 2.127 4.000
w/o BOF 0.0 0.25 A 2.383 4.000
0.0 0.50 A 2.642 4.000
0.0 0.75 A 2.905 4.000
0.0 1.00 A 3.172 4.000
F&M 0.0 0.0 A 1.848 4.000
w/BOF 0.0 0.25 A 2.054 4.000
0.0 0.50 A 2.260 4.000
0.0 0.75 A 2.464 4.000
0.0 1.0 A 2.667 4.000
0.25 0.0 A 1.982 4.000
0.25 0.25 A 2.142 4.000
0.25 0.50 A 2.302 4.000
0.25 0.75 A 2.462 4.000
0.25 1.0 A 2.621 4.000
0.50 0.0 A 2.102 4.000
0.50 0.25 A 2.212 4.000
0.50 0.50 A 2.323 4.000
0.50 0.75 A 2.433 4.000
0.50 1.0 A 2.543 4.000
0.75 0.0 A 2.206 4.000
0.75 0.25 A 2.263 4.000
0.75 0.50 A 2.320 4.000
0.75 0.75 A 2.377 4.000
0.75 1.0 A 2.434 4.000
1.0 0.0 A 2.291 4.000
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Table 2
Area Fire - 300 Meters
TACTIC RHO ETA VICTOR OFF. CAS. DEF. CAS
F&M 0.0 0.0 A 3.803 4.000
w/o BOF 0.0 0.25 A 3.932 4.000
0.0 0.50 A 4.023 4.000
0.0 0.75 A 4.080 4.000
0.0 1.0 A 4.104 4.000
F&M 0.0 0.0 D 8.040 3.568
w/BOF 0.0 0.25 D 8.040 3.839
0.0 0.50 A 7.280 4.000
0.0 0.75 A 6.807 4.000
0.0 1.0 A 6.152 4.000
0.25 0.0 A 7.397 4.000
0.25 0.25 A 7.157 4.000
0.25 0.50 A 6.698 4.000
0.25 0.75 A 6.231 4.000
0.25 1.0 A 5.756 4.000
0.50 0.0 A 6.495 4.000
0.50 0.25 A 6.202 4.000
0.50 0.50 A 5.905 4.000
0.50 0.75 A 5.605 4.000
0.50 1.0 A 5.301 4.000
0.75 0.0 A 5.363 4.000
0.75 0.25 A 5.220 4.000
0.75 0.50 A 5.840 4.000
0.75 0.75 A 5.745 4.000
0.75 1.0 A 5.650 4.000
1.0 0.0 A 5.333 4.000
M,
Table 3
Aimed Fire - 200 Meters
TACTIC RHO ETA VICTOR OFF. CAS. DEF. CAS
F&M 0.0 0.0 A 2.182 4.000
w/o BOF 0.0 0.25 A 2.437 4.000
0.0 0.50 A 2.696 4.000
0.0 0.75 A 2.960 4.000
0.0 1.0 A 3.228 4.000
F&M 0.0 0.0 A 1.934 4.000
w/BOF 0.0 0.25 A 2.094 4.000
0.0 0.50 A 2.250 4.000
0.0 0.75 A 2.403 4.000
0.0 1.0 A 2.550 4.000
0.25 0.0 A 2.144 4.000
0.25 0.25 A 2.273 4.000
0.25 0.50 A 2.400 4.000
0.25 0,75 A 2.524 4.000
0.25 1.0 A 2.646 4.000
0.50 0.0 A 2.346 4.000
0.50 0.25 A 2.438 4.000
0.50 0.50 A 2.530 4.000
0.50 0.75 A 2.620 4.000
0.50 1.0 A 2.710 4.000
0.75 0.0 A 2.536 4.000
0.75 0.25 A 2.585 4.000
0.75 0.50 A 2.634 4.000
0.75 0.75 A 2.683 4.000
0.75 1.0 A 2.732 4.000
1.0 0.0 A 2.707 4.000
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Table 4
Area Fire - 2 00 Meters
TACTIC RHO ETA VICTOR OFF . CAS. DEF. CAS
F&M 0.0 0.0 A 6.396 4.000
w/o BOF 0.0 0.25 A 5.991 4.000
0.0 0.50 A 5.575 4.000
0.0 0.75 A 5.146 4,000
0.0 1.0 A 4.707 4.000
F&M 0.0 0.0 D 8.040 2.291
w/BOF 0.0 0.25 D 8 040 2.407
0.0 0.50 D 8 040 2.522
0.0 0.75 D 8 040 2.874
0.25 0.0 D 8 181 2.461
0.25 0.25 D 8 181 2.546
0.25 0.50 D 8 181 2.669
0.25 0.75 D 8 .181 2.817
0.25 1.0 D 8 181 2.963
0.50 0.0 D 8 .314 2.670
0.50 0.25 D 8 314 2.768
0.50 0.50 D 8 314 2.865
0.50 0.75 D 8 314 2.962
0.50 1.0 D 8 314 3.058
0.75 0.0 D 8 440 2.967
0.75 0.25 D 8 440 3.015
0.75 0.50 D 8 440 3.063
0.75 0.75 D 8 .440 3.110
0.75 1.0 D 8 .440 3.157
1.0 0.0 D 8 .559 3.302
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VII. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
A model has been developed in this thesis to predict the casualties
for both sides in an infantry attack on a defended position. The results
of this model show that for the attacks launched at distances of 2 00 and
300 meters from a defended position, a base of fire should be used by
the offensive unit if aimed fire is employed by both sides, i.e. , all
targets are visible. However, if area fire is employed by both sides,
i.e. , no targets are visible except the maneuver element, the assault
should be carried out by the entire attacking force
.
While these results seem quite reasonable, there are many areas
of the model which could be further studied. One is the concept of
aimed and area fire. Aimed fire presumes perfect intelligence about
the enemy. That is, the enemy's location is always known, and when
he is killed, fire is immediately shifted to a new target. On the other
hand, area fire presumes no intelligence about the enemy except for
his general location.
In most cases, neither one of these extremes holds exclusively.
A worthwhile effort would be to examine the model with different com-
binations of these two types of fire.
Another shortcoming of the model is that it is designed for only
single shot weapons. Since automatic weapons are very much a part of
modern warfare , altering the model to handle correlated rounds from other
than single shot weapons would be most beneficial.
In the model, it was assumed that if defenders were assigned to
fire at the maneuvering element, they would do so exclusively. Thus,
this group of riflemen would not be firing at all when no element of the
assault group was making a rush. It would be interesting to see how the
results would change if these defenders were to fire at the prone members
of the assault group when a maneuvering element was not visible.
Another refinement which could be made in the model would be to
shorten the rush distance as the range to the defenders decreased. This
could be done either by programming shorter rush distances at shorter
ranges or by making the rush distance a function of the defenders' fire.
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